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Needed – A Netherlands Stabilization and Reconstruction Force

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: Needed – A Netherlands Stabilization and Reconstruction Force

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Thesis: In order to remain relevant in 21st century conflicts, the Dutch need to rapidly develop an expeditionary Netherlands Stabilization and Reconstruction Force that will support its NATO and European allies with enabling capabilities and serve as a bridge between the end of combat operations or humanitarian disaster and the point at which a civilian-led, re-building effort is up and running.

Discussion: After the 1995 Balkan operations and the conclusion reached by political leaders that the Netherlands Armed Forces are no longer needed to defend the territorial boundaries, it is time for a debate about the primary mission of the Dutch military. For the Dutch government the *Just Cause* to use force is more important than ever. Furthermore recovery of international law and order is seen as the fundamental basis for future peaceful co-existence. War is viewed as legitimate only when after combat the defeated nation and population are supported in the reconstruction of their society and infrastructure. Against this background of the national debate about the purpose and necessity of armed forces and the reality that contemporary Dutch military operations do not involve major combat, it is the authors opinion that it is time for a new political and military reality. The classical way of war, the doctrine of ultimate and mass violence, has to change. The political choice must be made as to whether or not the Netherlands Armed Forces should obtain the capability for after-war-operations and build a force for stabilization and reconstruction operations. This paper promotes such a transformation and refines its analysis by specifically considering the pillars of DOTES: **D**octrine, **O**rganization, **T**raining, **E**quipment, and **S**upport.

Conclusion: The Netherlands Armed Force structure should transform itself into an integrated, compatible, and credible entity to ensure that it becomes relevant to stabilization and reconstruction operations around the timeframe of 2015. The proposed Netherlands Stabilization and Reconstruction Force should have assets capable of enabling a wide variety of stabilization and reconstruction missions. The author recommends capabilities as long-range strategic transportation, security and stabilization forces, reconstruction specialists, road and helicopter transportation and logistical and medical supporting units. When these conditions are set, the Dutch will remain relevant in 21st century conflicts, support her NATO and European allies with these enabling capabilities and serve internationally as the needed bridge between the end of major combat operations or humanitarian disasters and the point at which a civilian-led, re-building effort is up and running.

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INTRODUCTION

“This mission is too important and too hard to rely on cobbling”

Arthur K. Cebrowski

It is 2006. After the 1995 Balkan operations and the conclusion reached by political leaders that the Netherlands Armed Forces (NAF) are no longer needed to defend the territorial boundaries, it is time for a debate about the primary mission for the Dutch military.¹ For the Dutch government the *Just Cause* to use force is more important than ever. Furthermore recovery of international law and order is seen as the fundamental basis for global peaceful co-existence. War is viewed as legitimate only when after combat the defeated nation and population are supported in the reconstruction of their society and infrastructure. Therefore the purpose of war must entail transformation to a full and equal member of the international democratic community.

Against this background of the national debate about the purpose and necessity of the NAF it is time for a new political and military reality. It is the author's opinion that for the Netherlands the classical way of war, the doctrine of ultimate and mass violence, has to change. Participation in major combat operations and the enormous cost related to the increasing complexity of warfighting no longer fit the national political or fiscal reality. However, the Netherlands, emersed in the complexities of the European security environment, cannot hide in complete isolation and has to live up to the international responsibilities of her alliances.² The solution for this security dilemma is translated in a light-infantry brigade ground force, two squadrons of fighters and five frigates as contribution to NATO's Response Forces and the European Rapid Reaction Force.³

Nevertheless, concerning multi-national coalitions the Netherlands must know where it stands.⁴ The political choice must be made that the NAF can obtain the capability for after-war-

operationsⁱ and build forces for Stabilization and Reconstruction (S&R) operations. Not only is this a sector undergoing rapid change within the United States of America, it is also an area which is receiving attention in the NATO and European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).⁵ This paper promotes such a transformation and refines its analysis by specifically considering the pillars of DOTES: **D**octrine, **O**rganization, **T**raining, **E**quipment, and **S**upport. In the end the study concludes that the structure of the NAF must drastically be reorganized and should be based on an expeditionary and modular S&R character. Future contingencies will impose a diverse array of conditions and require unique capabilities, therefore the Netherlands Stabilization and Reconstruction Force (NSRF) should have assets capable of enabling a wide variety of S&R missions. The recommended contribution of Dutch long-range strategic transportation, security and stabilization forces, reconstruction specialists, road and helicopter transportation and supporting units will ensure that the NAF remain relevant in 21st century conflicts. These enabling capabilities will alter the Dutch role in NATO and the European alliances. Instead of participation in major combat operations, the NSRF will serve as the, missing but much needed, bridge between the end of combat operations or humanitarian disaster and the point at which a civilian-led, re-building effort is up and running.

Doctrine - The manner in which a military operates is defined by its doctrine.⁶ One of the achievements of European and Atlantic cooperation over the last fifty years is that, militarily, the Netherlands have no longer anything to fear from their neighbors.⁷ Because of this reality, the Dutch approach to a world of failing states, crime and corruption, and of gross violations of human rights is underpinned by strong empathy for the fate of the peoples directly affected by

ⁱ After-war-operations are related to the period immediately after major combat operations. Planning ingredients for after-war-operations will include: a history of suppression of the local population, a destroyed national infrastructure, and a government and civil administration that no longer functions.

these problems. However, national actions must be determined strongly by the realization that security and stability are essential conditions for political, economic and social development. On the basis of the intensive participation in peace support operations throughout the 1990's, primarily in the form of ground force engagements, the Dutch *Defense White Paper 2000* identified two key requirements. The first requirement was that the operational deployability of all elements of the NAF has to be improved. The second requirement was that the forces must be capable of sustaining participation in all types of peace support operations for long periods.

The concept for what this paper calls after-war-operations is based on the fundamental principle that after a victorious war a victorious peace should be the logical result. This concept offers extra flexibility for participation and enables coalition forces in S&R operations.




Figure 1: S&R capability - bridge to Nation-building.⁸

The idea is that the S&R force will serve as a bridge between the end of major combat operations and the point at which a civilian-led, nation-building effort is up and running.⁹ In such contingencies, stabilization refers to the process of halting residual violence, suppressing remaining opposition, and bringing order and security to the occupied country. Reconstruction refers to early measures taken by military forces to repair damage and restore such essentials as drinking water, electrical power, medicine, and transportation before the arrival of civilian nation-building assets. To support this concept the NAF have to deliver two key capabilities:

first, the mentioned security contribution to NATO and ESDP sponsored combat operations and second, predominant S&R forces for after-war-operations.¹⁰

Organization - The first major decision is to merge the different services. Second, the leadership must be re-educated to function in a new management mentality. The philosophy is that military leaders during their military careers also fulfill administrative, social and political functions at civil institutions. This, in addition to their military experience, will better prepare and provide them with comprehension of the democratic decision-making principles and aspects of public order and security. Secondly, the structure of the NAF must be based on the principle of an expeditionary and modular character. Because future contingencies will impose different conditions and requirements, the NSRF should have assets which can perform a wide variety of S&R functions.¹¹ Table 1 illustrates a notional NSRF structure, comprised of a national S&R headquarter with three regimental-sized modular forces, that would provide expeditionary and task-organized assets for S&R missions in one major area of operation.

S&R Force structure	Manpower	W/o security	Regiment
National S&R Headquarter	550	550	-
Regimental Command elements (3)	270	270	90
Communication Companies (3)	375	375	125
Security Battalions (6)	4,800		800
Marechaussee Companies (6)	750	750	125
Civil Affairs Companies (3)	270	270	90
Construction Engineer Battalions (3)	2,700	2,700	900
Field Dressing Stations (6)	2,400	2,400	400
Transport Aviation Squadrons (4)	480	480	120
Transport Truck Companies (3)	315	315	105
EOD platoons (6)	180	180	30
Chemical / Biological platoons (3)	90	90	30
Service Support Battalions (3)	2,700	2,700	900
Totals	15,880	11,080	3,715

*Table 1: A notional NSRF and modular regimental structure.*¹²

All modular elements must be embedded in an expeditionary regimental-sized organization which is made up of a command element, a security and stabilization element, a transportation element, a reconstruction element, and a service support element (figure 2).




Figure 2: The notional NSRF "toolbox" to build an expeditionary regimental-sized NSRF.

Based on the required NSRF manpower and force capabilities, the total strength of the NAF can be downsized from 55,000 to around 35,000 persons and be organized in three rapid deployable, self-sufficient and independent task forces of approximately 3,700 persons.ⁱⁱ All elements of the modular task forces should be expeditionary in character and organized for deployment in one major area of operation. The deployed regimental staff will be supported by a national S&R headquarters which forms the link between the operational and political level. The principal staff sections would be doctrinal joint staff elements, J-1 through J-6. The responsibility for each section would relate to the new doctrine for S&R operations and must have the skills to plan and conduct multifaceted operations. The special staff supports the principal staff on specific issues.

ⁱⁱ The proposed strength of the NAF force structure of approximately 35,000 persons is based on 15,880 for the NSRF while 19,120 persons are reserved to support NATO and EDSP responsibilities.

The civil-military section will coordinate with personnel from international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and local and national civilian governments as necessary.

Personnel assigned as interagency liaisons will coordinate interagency support and requirements.

The legal-military action cell must include a legal counsel staff, including international law and war crimes counselors. Another specialty that has to be included is a special advisor desk capable of advising on religious and cultural issues as well as political factors. This section will also have appropriate translation technology and linguist capabilities.

The command element must have an expeditionary organization with a forward command element and a main regimental staff. This regimental staff-level headquarters is organized with primary staff sections to direct the subordinate units. The forward command element will be deployed well in advance to establish control of the S&R operation during and immediately after termination of major combat. The regimental staff will follow immediately after the forward element has organized itself in the area of operation and when appropriate the regiment will be deployed in its entirety. The regimental staff should be able to organize or support local authorities at a regional level.

The security element is for force protection and security missions mainly constructed from the light infantry units from the former airmobile and marine battalions. These special operation units are historically trained for operations in complex terrain (littorals, mountains, jungle, desert and hot or cold weather) under difficult and uncertain circumstances. Every security battalion has organic medium fire support assets and must be supported by an amphibious mechanized company capable of transporting units in different kinds of terrain and under the protection of light armor. The security element should be able to liaise with major combat forces in order to plan, employ and ask for the assistance of heavy fire or air support

assets when the local situation deteriorates. For the restoration and keeping of public order and to support local constabulary organizations the stabilization element must have integrated Marechaussee companies.ⁱⁱⁱ In addition to support the Marechaussee companies also have the task of educating and training local police forces to restore and maintain order. Each company should also include criminal investigation teams to deal with the potential for criminalized power structures and organized crime. When not deployed these Marechaussee companies are integrated in the national military police force and used for their regular national missions. Rotation is dependant on the planned duration of the S&R deployment but will be on a regular basis to maintain their policing skills within Dutch society.

The nucleus of the reconstruction element is based on engineer battalions with as primary mission the reconstruction of infrastructure and basic human needs (clean drinking water, electricity, port infrastructure, airport infrastructure, road infrastructure, de-mining, etc.). Engineer battalions must be formed out of existing units and will be assisted by project leaders and skilled labor from all different arenas of reconstruction. These units will be task-organized based on the anticipated mission, necessities and the local situation. Another crucial part of the reconstruction element is the civil-administration support unit which provides general civil-affairs expertise at the local level, such as government administration and services. Vital for the reconstruction element is an understanding that success of the restoration is based on the education and training that is given to the local population and that the use of local businesses and trade can make the difference between success or failure. In addition EOD and Chemical / Biological teams are recommended to be part of the NSRF. These teams will work closely with the Marechaussees and engineers, to advise and conduct specialized operations. Specialized

ⁱⁱⁱ The Royal Marechaussee is the standing constable force which forms a separate national service in the force structure of the Netherlands.

operations include bomb disposal, unexploded ordnance removal, weapons collection and disposal, and mine clearing.

The transportation element ensures the mobile character of the NSRF. The Netherlands lack adequate long-range strategic transportation (air and sea-born) to lift a regiment-sized force to the area of operation on short notice. For strategic air lift the NSRF will be dependent on allies, for sea-born lift therefore it is recommended that the first reaction-force of the NSRF be forward deployed on national amphibious transport ships. In addition local transportation should primarily be based on helicopters which are initially based and maintained on the amphibious ships. When the regiment is fully deployed and established ashore the helicopters can be deployed to an expeditionary landing zone close to where they may support the S&R mission. Helicopter transportation will be provided by three Transport Helicopter squadrons, two specialized in medium maritime and littoral support while the other is specialized in heavy, land-based, logistics support. The inherent flexibility and mobility that helicopters offer in an environment where roads are poor or insecure and in the complex nature inherent of this sort of operations can hardly be overemphasized. The transportation of people as well as the capability to bring all classes of supplies to inaccessible areas are factors that deserve equal and strict attention. Nevertheless, helicopters alone will not be sufficient. Along with the amphibious armored vehicles for the security forces there will be a need for road transportation assets capable to maneuver in the complex environment. The transportation assets should be expeditionary and multi-purpose which means that they are easy to deploy into the area of operation and that they can perform a large variety of cargo and personnel transportation tasks.

The NSRF will have to rely heavily on their reconstruction and service support units designed with enabling synergistic capabilities and the ability to deliver cumulative effects.¹³

These elements bring early measures to repair damage, restore essentials as electrical power and provide timely delivery of the needed supplies and equipment throughout the area of operation. In theatres where allied forces are already deployed, resources from combat units could be used to augment their ongoing efforts. The service support element will be deployed well in advance together with the forward command element, to assess which support and emergency equipment are needed first. The medical support unit is organized in accordance with the Field Dressing Station concept. Its primary missions are humanitarian assistance, indigenous emergency / first responder medical training, food and water decontamination, and other minor health services.

Training - Personnel of the NSRF are military professionals but after their initial military training further educated and skilled in civilian businesses. Recruiting will be based on the ability to learn a civilian skill against a military background. Recruits sign a contract for four years to serve with the NSRF and choose a field of expertise in which they want to be trained. After they serve their contract, the personnel will return to a job in society. Since the skill sets of NSRF personnel are also valuable within Dutch society, and members of the NSRF will gain valuable experience supporting, teaching and training other nationals, the Dutch government will assist in outplacement for every individual that leaves the NSRF and transfers to a reserve status.

To plan and execute S&R missions, the NSRF is exposed to an extensive Pre-deployment Training Program (PTP). At the conclusion of the PTP, the NSRF executes the Stabilization and Reconstruction Certification Exercise (SRCEX). This exercise is an evaluation coordinated by the national supporting staff and forms the basis for certification of a regiment as operations capable. Certification will be granted only when the force has successfully accomplished the required missions and demonstrates the required capabilities. Within NATO and the EDSP the individual nations are responsible for the unit level readiness and deployment training. At present, there is

neither an integrated standardized training program available to educate, integrate and train S&R units as a combined force. Nor is there a certification process. This situation is not acceptable and has to change for the future. A good starting point to consider the necessary core capabilities of a NSRF is to review the proposed Mission Essential Task List (METL). The analysis must be focused on the capabilities that are expected to be relevant. Many factors must be considered when reviewing capabilities: the probability for the actual use of the capability, redundancy, and the cost benefit relationship. The NSRF should provide modular, forward deployed, flexible, sea- and land-based forces. The forces must be capable of rapidly executing S&R operations, disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, and other supporting operations in order to enable the introduction of follow-on, civilian-led, re-building agencies. An overview of these, assumed NSRF capabilities and Mission Essential Tasks is provided in table 2.

CORE CAPABILITIES	MISSION ESSENTIAL TASKS
Security Operations	Local Peace Enforcement Direct actions Non-combatant Evacuation Operations Airfield / Port control Anti-Terrorism actions Seizure/Recovery of Energy Facilities (on and off-shore)
Stability Operations	Peacekeeping Control local law and order Training and education of local police force Visit, Board, Search and Seizure Operations (VBSS) Civil Affairs (Limited) Coordination, and Control in a Joint/Combined Environment Provide (limited) Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (C4)
Reconstruction Operations	Construction and rebuilding of infrastructure Power generation Water purification Civil Affairs EOD Mine-clearing Education and training Local businesses and contractor involvement
Supporting Operations: Disaster Relief Humanitarian Assistance	Enabling Operations Medical support Logistic supply Evacuation transport Shelter facilities and construction Policing Civil Affairs

Table 2: Envisioned NSRF capabilities and Mission Essential Tasks.

The willingness to embrace change is an organization's greatest strength.¹⁴ Every institution must study its performance and training programs to determine whether it is preparing for the right number and type of missions. Peacekeeping operations, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief account for nearly 90% of the contingency operations conducted by the NAF.¹⁵ At some point, given limited training time and assets, the creation of the NSRF opens the possibility to focus training on the most likely and relevant capabilities and tasks the NAF will have to deal with.

Equipment - Operational and technical interoperability of equipment is difficult to achieve. Here the interface between operational capabilities and technical enablers offers cooperation between coalition partners and “determines whether units from different countries operating together can complete a mission.”¹⁶ Equipment is a difficult area to get right for three reasons. First, a nation's political and economic interests are reflected in their differing national procurement strategies. Second, the complexities of the contemporary security environment have, in recent years, resulted in ad hoc “coalitions of the willing” being formed by untraditional alliance partners who do not have experience of working together. Finally, the astronomical cost of developing equipment programs hinders interoperability. Hence, interoperability will never be perfect and a balance in spending is required to achieve acceptable levels of interoperability by sensible measures in design, procurement and force structures.¹⁷ Nonetheless, the Dutch cannot afford to stand still, and should invest in key enabling equipment to increase S&R abilities and complement allied interoperability. To that end, what enhancements are envisaged for the NSRF and how do they contribute to NATO or European interoperability?

First, since the Netherlands lack adequate long-range strategic transportation (air and sea-born) a valuable contribution would be the expansion of the strategic airlift and amphibious lift capacity. The proposed strategic airlift capacity must consist of a squadron of global reach cargo

aircraft (C-17 or equivalent airframe) while the amphibious lift must consist of the two Landing Platform Docks (the Enforcer types^{iv}; HNLMS *Rotterdam* and HNLMS *Johan de Witt*) and one new to build Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD). As described earlier, helicopters play an important role in the expeditionary S&R doctrine. If this point is accepted, it should lead to the recommendation that the NSRF is provided with strategic airlift and a new LHD to bring S&R assets and helicopters into the area of operation. The Netherlands Ministry of Defense should at least build one approximately 20,000-ton Landing Helicopter Dock, capable of carrying 16 medium-lift helicopters and four landing craft to land vehicles and heavy equipment.¹⁸ The deployment from these ships provides the NSRF with a safe, self-sustaining and flexible environment without any political commitment until the force is deployed. This sea-born base of operation gives a high-tech capability for command and control, prevents the need to establish local land-bases before hostilities are completely over and forms a highly enabling capacity to support operations.^v

However, amphibious ships and a squadron of medium maritime helicopters alone will not be sufficient. Another squadron of medium and a squadron of heavy helicopters will be needed to support the NSRF with cargo and logistic distribution when it is fully deployed. These assets will be the workhorses of the NSRF aviation support. Next to maritime and vertical transportation there will also be a need for road cargo and personnel transportation. These ground transportation assets must be easy to deploy, survivable, capable of maneuver in a complex environment and perform a large variety of cargo-hauling and personnel transportation tasks. In this light, the

^{iv} The Enforcer is Royal Schelde's modular ships design.

^v Amphibious ships, as force-multiplier, provide an immense capacity for medical support, safe haven for displaced persons and specialized functions such as water production, tool shops, bakeries, laundry facilities, etc..

author recommends that the security battalions have amphibious mechanized vehicles capable of transporting units in complex terrain and under the protection of light armor.^{vi}

In addition to the protection of specialized vehicles the security and stabilization forces need unique personal protection and a wide variety of tools to project proportionate force on the civilian population. Tools must be designed to suppress crowds or individuals and execute the appropriate rules of engagement without directly igniting violence. The reconstruction battalion must be equipped with specialized heavy construction vehicles, equipment and tools. However, the emphasis should be on emergency equipment, in particular, power generators, water purifiers, pipeline, fuel storage, bridging, shelters, and other stocks that will be in urgent demand as conflict abates. The S&R logistic concept should encompass the establishment of pre-packed stocks on-board the amphibious ships and /or pre-positioned stocks in warehouses ready to be deployed to the area of operation.

Support from population - Clausewitz' dictum that "war is not a mere act of policy but a true political instrument" suggests that states must have similar political interests and values in order to form or support a S&R mission.¹⁹ Although such similarity may often be the case, there will be times when nations' political rationales for engaging in hostilities vary. What about the Dutch popular acceptance of military force? A radio program on one of the national networks recently attracted attention with its own opinion poll, which showed that some 60 per cent of the Dutch believe that the armed forces should be deployed for *humanitarian purposes* only.

Another optimistic view with regard to popular support for S&R operations in a broad sense is based on the following points. First, the Dutch traditionally attach great importance to the promotion of the international rule of law. This is even laid down in the Constitution.²⁰ Second, as the link between the security of the Netherlands and elsewhere in the world becomes

^{vi} Candidates would be the Norwegian BVS10 Viking or the American Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle.

increasingly clear, so does the link between the deployment of peace enabling forces abroad and the welfare of people at home. Finally, high-quality and technologically enabling forces are in keeping with the status as the fourteenth largest economy in the world.

Virtually all European forces now assigned to NATO as readily available forces are configured for major combat operations. The manpower and ready formations to generate a sizeable sustained S&R response are lacking. To fill this shortfall, the Netherlands military contribution to NATO and the EDSP, should above all look at the capabilities they can field in S&R operations. Additionally, NATO-assigned forces have capability shortfalls, including long-range strategic mobility, helicopters, civil affairs, administrators, linguists, construction and civil engineers, medical units, and humanitarian assistance facilities.²¹ The Netherlands has an obligation to reduce these shortcomings and deficiencies and to improve her S&R capabilities. This means a far-reaching defense reform or re-role program and a change from major combat operations to the emphasis on the S&R role within NATO and the EDSP. This reform should guarantee a specialized highly capable and modern NSRF, which can act side-by-side allies while integrating support elements whenever possible.²²

CONCLUSION

The last decade has seen significant changes in the conduct of warfare, and there is nothing to suggest that the next will be any different. This paper posits that the Netherlands is unable to sustain a traditional NAF of a technological quality capable of major combat operations. Against this background it is time for a new military reality. The author recommends a radical political choice to transform the NAF to a capability for after-war-operations and reorganize the national force structure in support of allied S&R operations.

Doctrine is fundamental and sets the vision of how a NSRF intend to think and how to operate. The Dutch doctrine must focus on winning the peace: stabilization and reconstruction of an invaded or demolished country. Creating a NSRF requires transformation because needed capabilities and assets are different from those of combat formations. In an era of Organizational changes, due to budget cuts and military downsizing, the reform to enable the deployment of expeditionary forces, is necessary. However, the development of a new force structure should be realistic and result in missions that are supported by society, achievable and can be developed in contemporary training programs. At present, there is no Training program to train the NSRF as a capable expeditionary force. In addition, a certification process should be developed to validate operational readiness. The proposed PTP provides an excellent example how the Netherlands can develop its expeditionary S&R training. Highly-Technical and costly Equipment might be difficult to achieve. The development of the NSRF should not rest on expensive equipment. Instead, the NSRF should represent a change in “mindset” in order to execute S&R missions in support of NATO and the EDSP. Additionally popular Supportability is essential for both the development of the NSRF, and to ensure its subsequent cohesion.

In sum, the NAF should transform into a credible entity to ensure that it becomes relevant to S&R operations around the timeframe of 2015. The proposed NSRF should have capabilities as long-range strategic transportation, security and stabilization forces, reconstruction specialists, road and helicopter transportation and logistical and medical supporting units to enable a wide variety of S&R missions. When these conditions are set, the Dutch will remain relevant in 21st century conflicts, support her NATO and European allies, and serve internationally as the needed bridge between the end of major combat operations or humanitarian disasters and the point at which a civilian-led, re-building effort is up and running.

Endnotes

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- ¹ Netherlands Defense White Papers, Parlement 1999-2000, 26 900 nrs. 1-2, 47.
- ² Centre for Defence Studies King's College London, *Achieving the Helsinki Headline Goals*, (Discussion Paper, November 2001). The Helsinki European Council of Dec 1999 where the European Union (EU) announced their European Security and Defense Initiative. The council adopted a Headline Goal defining the repertory of force capabilities needed for EU-led operations, and launched the process of getting European states to pledge national contributions to it.
- ³ Prinsjesdagbrief 2003, 24-25.
- ⁴ Frits Bolkenstein: www.europe.eu.int/comm/archives/commission_1999_2004/bolkenstein/docs/speeches.htm : The Netherlands regards itself as the smallest of the big countries, but other European Member States, regard it as the biggest of the small countries.
- ⁵ Alex Roney, *EU Fact Book, Fifth Edition*, (London: Kogan Page Ltd, 1998). ESDP is the policy by which Europe can rectify the balance between European and American contribution to global security and stability issues, and generate a constructive contribution to NATO.
- ⁶ Henk Kamp (2004), *The Netherlands Armed Forces* (RUSI Journal, Jun 2004, Vol. 149, Iss. 3), 42. The three NAF core tasks: protection of national and allied territory (including the protection of the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba); promotion of the international rule of law and stability; and both national and international support for civil authorities in the context of law enforcement, disaster relief and humanitarian aid. The Dutch social and political will to employ forces align most with tasks two and three; thus within the concept of after-war-operations: a role in winning the peace.
- ⁷ Henk Kamp, 42.
- ⁸ Hans Binnendijk and Stuart E. Johnson, *Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations*, (Washington D.C.: National Defense University press, 2004), figure 3, XVI.
- ⁹ Bradley Graham (2003), *Pentagon Considers Creating Postwar Peacekeeping Forces* (Washington Post, November 24 2003), 16.
- ¹⁰ Strategic Vision Joint Chiefs Of Staff Integral Defense Plan period 2004-2013 (2002): The basis for the Integral Defense Plan of 2002 was as simple as it was courageous: make a choice for the structure of the military forces based on the most likely deployment option.
- ¹¹ Hans Binnendijk and Richard Kugler (2004), *Needed – A NATO Stabilization and Reconstruction Force* (Defense Horizons, No. 45), 2.
- ¹² Based on Hans Binnendijk and Stuart E. Johnson, table 4, 51.
- ¹³ Hans Binnendijk and Richard Kugler, 1.
- ¹⁴ According to the 30th USMC Commandant in his ALMAR 023/99, 10.
- ¹⁵ Netherlands Defense White Paper 2000, Ministry of Defense (The Hague), 29 November 1999, 53.
- ¹⁶ K. Gause, Lea C., Whiteneck D, Thompson E, 'US Navy Interoperability with its High-End Allies', URL: www.dodccrorg/2000ICCRTS/cd/papers/Track3/ , 4.
- ¹⁷ R. Cobbold (1997), *A Joint Maritime-Based Expeditionary Capability* (RUSI Journal), 27.
- ¹⁸ Nicholas Fiorenza (2002), *Increasing Sealift capacity, Shipbuilding programs plug critical gaps in European capabilities* (Armed Forces Journal International, 3/02), 52. A proposed candidate might be a LHD based on the new French Mistral Class LHD.
- ¹⁹ M. Handel, *Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought* (Portland: Frank Cass, 1996), 68.
- ²⁰ Article 90 of the Dutch Constitution promotes international Law and Order as a valuable Dutch value.
- ²¹ Hans Binnendijk and Richard Kugler, 3.
- ²² Henk M.H. Satijn (2005), *Naval Programmes* (Naval Forces, Vol. 26, Iss. 3), 149.

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